Konark Singhal cofounded MockBank, an edtech co that provided test prep for government exams. The startup saw some initial traction and were able to raise a small preseed round, but struggled to grow and scale. Eventually, the co was acquired by a well-funded competitor, and Konark exited MockBank to found and run Mountblue, a profitable bootstrapped coding bootcamp play. In our chat, Konark talks about his definition of PMF (effortless sales), whether MockBank had PMF (maybe, but essentially it was a tiny market so it didn’t really matter he says), and the importance of picking the right space. It is a candid confession from a battle-scarred founder. It is also a window into an India that was preJio, preUPI, with limited smartphone penetration, and where building a digital business was an uphill struggle.

(Please find below, the transcript of my conversation with Konark Singhal. The transcript has been edited to make it more readable. There will of course be errors; please excuse me for them.The interview was recorded during an in person meeting on 17th August 2022 in Bangalore.)


Sajith Pai: Hi Konark, so what I want to do is ask you a few questions on PMF. Feel free to deviate from it as you wish. Okay? I will bring you back if there’s a need to, but broadly, feel free to deviate, okay.  So you know the context, I want to get your thoughts on PMF? And just think about it in the context of MockBank. So when you and Manesh were starting MockBank, did you have a concept that, oh, we have to achieve PMF? Oh, we have to work towards PMF? Or was it more intuitive? And can you take me through that journey? You can also just think aloud, because a lot of time, you won’t be able to give me structured thoughts, but keep it just free flowing?

Konark Singhal: Yeah. We did understand that PMF needs to be achieved. But I won’t say we went about engineering it. We went about our way, in a manner that we’re trying to engineer our way to PMF. We knew that we had not achieved PMF. This we knew. But we did not say, okay, you know, this is the way to PMF, etc. There was a, there was a conscious, and there was a subconscious understanding that PMF is not there. And then what made me believe that PMF was not there is when visits to our site became 10x without any movement in our revenue whatsoever. That’s when I realized that actually PMF is not there. So, I really raised money after I thought there was PMF, because we grew very fast for four months. And we were getting customers faster than we could service them. We hadn’t engineered much, we had a team that was light on engineering, which is why a lot of our servicing was actually manual, which also kind of overwhelmed us and hence we, I mean, maybe if we had been engineering (automating) our way to servicing, then we would have not gotten overwhelmed. And then probably we would have thought that there is no PMF yet, it’s not big enough for PMF. But because you’re doing it in a manual manner, you’re getting overwhelmed, which also made us think that okay, looks like this is PMF because we can’t service it, you’re getting more people than we can service. It was really probably a service bandwidth issue, than otherwise. 

The way I think about this subject is that look, there was some PMF, but the market niche was probably very small. I mean, I can’t quite give a very erudite definition. Basically, what happened is that some people were coming (to the site). But we probably did not have any competitive edge. So we probably were amongst the first to market with that value proposition. We probably had low hanging fruits that we got very quickly, which made us believe that we had some PMF, some differentiation, probably. But as it turned out, we didn’t really have any differentiation. 

When other people came in, they took away some of our cherries. But they also didn’t quite do well because they did not have differentiation. So our erstwhile, I mean now that I look back at the biggest competitors we used to think about were people like Testbook, Online Tyyari, Olive Board, they all either withered away or kind of have really struggled through the years. Online Tyyari actually sold to Embibe after us and we, kind of the Embibe people who bought Online Tyyari, were actually the MockBank people (at Embibe). Manesh bought Online Tyyari for as much money as Embibe bought us, but Online Tyyari had raised probably five times more money than us. Maybe more. 

Testbook, I was just looking over while on my way there. Probably they did some ₹25 crore gross revenue last year, having (raised) ₹100 crores and they’d been with us from our first round seven years back. Yeah, I don’t quite think it’s a success. I mean, if it is ₹100 crores (raised) in seven years and still that ₹25 crore revenue and still have significant negative EBITDA. I don’t think it can be called a success yet. They might do well, and I wish them well, they might well become a success later. I think significant, similarly, Olive Board also, I think in a similar ₹12-13 Crore kind of revenue; they were around even before us, they probably also raised $3-4 million. So, I don’t quite think that people who were our cohort in that market also succeeded.

Sajith Pai: So just, just, let’s just get back. So today post MockBank, given that you’re running MountBlue, do you have some kind of a definition of PMF? If a young founder wanted to ask you for PMF, what would you say it is? 

Konark Singhal: Yeah really, it’s really about effortless sales. I would almost say if a sale is effortless, and you’re almost throttling it, because you can’t service it, I think it’s a probably a good empirical way to say you have a certain PMF. Now, again, PMF may be in a certain market which might be small. So you know, your PMF may still not be able to make you a big company. So I mean, PMF runs out so yeah, but in terms of what PMF is, the sales are very effortless. You’re having to almost throttle them, because you can’t service them well enough. I think that’s what I would call PMF. But we have to be conscious of what the limit of the market is. Well, you can hit it very quickly, sometimes.

Sajith Pai: Limits of the market determine the boundaries of PMF. Got it. So now, what were the metrics you’re using in MockBank? You said site visits went up 10x. So you were tracking site visits, clearly tracking revenue. MockBank was in the government exam space. So what were the metrics you’re tracking, which kind of gave you that feeling that oh, we’re on the right track to PMF?

Konark Singhal: No, I think that what gave us a feeling that we had some PMF was our revenue, which kind of became 5x in 2-3 months. Now, I think back and probably it was because there is some seasonality to the government business. Yeah, it probably was seasonality. So before funding we were tracking only revenue. After funding we were tracking both site visits and revenue and time spent on the site. I know that you need to have a much more well thought out funnel. The reason we did not spend too much effort building it is because we could actually very very easily ramp up our site visits. And I would have thought, site visitors and revenue would grow even if it doesn’t grow in lockstep? If site visitors grow 10x, then revenue should grow by 2-3x at least. But it wasn’t happening. It was actually coming down, for the seasonality reason as well. And that’s when I figured that boss you are very, very far from PMF. So, then my mind completely moved to figuring out what to do? One is to try to engineer and see what’s happening. Like look at the various phases of funnel and try to see, try to engineer each stage. But I thought that we were very far away from engineering our way out of it; I thought it was a fundamental market problem. And ultimately, I came to the conclusion that it was actually a market issue or so from what happened.

When this happened; you know after we raised money from Blume within three months or so, our site visits went 10x. Net Revenue actually either stayed flat or came down. It was such a big jolt to me that I thought that boss, you know, you can build out all you want, but leakage 3% yahan gir raha, 4% wahan gir raha hai (was seeing drops or leakage of 3-4% in the funnel everywhere), if you have a leaky bucket, it’s like you have no bottom. Right? So, then I put my cofounder in charge of the business-as-usual and let him do all the tweaks that he could to kind of grow things. I moved to working my way around understanding why this is happening, what’s happening, are other people doing well? I spent a good couple of months figuring out what happened by talking to all the other people in the ed-tech market. And I came up with – it was 2015 end and 2016 start, yeah, this is pre-Jio pre-demand stage, yeah – so I came to the conclusion that everyone was starving. 

Unacademy, at this time, at this point were still a fairly successful YouTube channel. Yeah, they were really not the behemoth that they are now or even three years back. That time Vedantu was also struggling. I met Vamsi many times to figure out what was happening with them. They had probably 2x our revenue, but  nothing (exceptional). He had seven lakhs (revenue in ₹) one day, probably 50 lakhs a month. Everyone was struggling, Testbook, Online Tyyari, Embibe and Olive Board, these are the four most well known people in our segment. But everyone was struggling. The only people doing anything in terms of revenue were Byju’s and Toppr. And then it was only K-12. Post pandemic, a lot of other segments (in EdTech) have also taken off but for the longest time K-12 was the only thing in edtech. Pre pandemic, I would say it was pretty much only K-12. Right? More or less. 

So then I felt you have to do something. This idea of MockBank bothered me. For fundamentally, I am generally much more of a B2B guy. And then the MockBank experience was B2C. But it was not working, the B2C here wasn’t working. So then I had the option of doing a like to pivot into kind of K-12 which was doing well and was kind of clearly a big money game. Byju’s had already raised; it was already a unicorn or very close to being a unicorn. They were fairly big. Yeah, for that time, too, it was a really big Series A.  And Toppr also had raised $20 million or something, and then also $10 million, something from Fidelity or someone. So this is a really big money game, but it’s B2C, I didn’t have really much confidence in my B2C ability. 

And then there was this MountBlue idea which was gnawing at me, which I knew I could just bootstrap and make a very good ₹ 10 cr company out of it. So then I decided to talk to my co-founders, that I wanted to pivot to this and they didn’t quite agree with it. Which is when we figured let’s not raise; look we could raise another check of ₹5 crores; Blume would probably have supported or you could have gotten some angels to come. There was enough FOMO going around in the market, then also there are some people with some low quality money that could have come; ₹ 5 crores would not have been difficult to raise. And we would have and because I generally build very frugally, I would have easily taken three years for the ₹ 5 crores to last. But then I knew that there was just no PMF anywhere in the market, not only me, if somebody else in my same segment had PMF, then I would have tried to engineer that PMF myself. Because no one in the segment had PMF and I thought it probably is just too tough. It’s probably too much. It’s too early, maybe I mean, it’s not the right time.

Sajith Pai: What was the issue? Was that because people were not willing to pay? Or the market being small?

Konark Singhal: It was both. People, it was a lot of people not willing to pay. Basically, look the thing with Sarkari Naukri Prep (Govt Jobs Test Prep) is that the content is not that tough. Unless you look at civil services; apart from civil service, most of the kind of prep content is fairly simple. They are always reasonably cheap; free offerings or very cheap offers, right?. So they are always a race to zero. That’s one. Secondly, there was also not, I mean, willingness to pay was one but also means to pay and this is all pre demonetization. So, you know, 10% of our customers are asking can we give cash? So, how do you like, collect 200 rupees from Baghpat?  

Anyway, Bhim app was launched in 2016 after demonetisation. Online payments took off in 2016 really if you ask me, and of course after the pandemic it acquired another life of its own. So, both the willingness to pay and the instruments to pay, I think, both were a problem, right? And also consumption, but also, all of it was pre Jio. Jio made a splash in 2016 end, and moved the ecosystem in ‘17 thereabouts. So we were kind of  running out of steam in mid-2016. We still had a crore in the bank. But we knew we are not going anywhere. 

Sajith Pai: When did the sale to Embibe happen? 

Konark Singhal: Embibe final closure would have probably happened sometime 18-19 given paperwork. But I think the team kind of moved to the roles in mid-2017. 

Sajith Pai: Fair. Question. Go to market. So when you launched in 2015…

Konark Singhal: We launched in 2013 May.

Sajith Pai: Launched around 13 May. The Blume round happened when?

Konark Singhal: On 2015 May.

Sajith Pai: So launched May 2013. Blume round was in May 2015. Was there any intermediate round? Then, when you started, how did you get your first 1000 customers? They were all individuals given B2C, right? How did you get your first customers?

Konark Singhal:  All low hanging fruit, Sajith. So basically, we just did it. We were early, these keywords are very cheap on Google. Basically, we were kind of almost the first team of any quality to do this. There were some people doing it. I won’t call them high quality people. I mean, they were bad. Right now, if you go to Google Adwords and see Bank PO, you can see how keenly competitive it is to bid. At that time, there was no one bidding for Bank PO. We used to get a click for like a rupee or two. Really like the minimum Google price at that time. So literally my first sale happened 10 minutes after my first Google ad, like I remember, I think we went live at 11:41; that is probably when a Google Ad went live. 11:53 I had the first sale. It was a site built on WordPress. I literally decided to launch end of April. And I think by second of May I had my first sale on a site I quickly put together in WordPress. 

Sajith Pai: So you fundamentally leveraged the Google Adwords performance marketing funnel? 

Konark Singhal: Yes. Yes. 

Sajith Pai: Did you use any other media?

Konark Singhal: I did. By the end, we would have put on Facebook ads. Well, I mean, towards the end we made content as well. Also, email marketing. Email marketing was big for us.

Sajith Pai: So about the email marketing you did, where do you get the emails from?

Konark Singhal: People used to come to our site (and register), and we used to buy some databases.

Sajith Pai: It is called Drip Marketing. 

Konark Singhal: Yeah, we’re not, we’re not as sophisticated. We’ll be like, I think aaj ek campaign karna hai toh kar diya. It is not like CleverTap me daal diya hai toh automated raat ko chala jatyega, you know. (We didn’t have a systematic plan for email marketing using MarTech tools like CleverTap; we just winged it.) 

Sajith Pai: Tell me, did your CAC keep going up as competition came? 

Konark Singhal: We didn’t see this; because we were very frugal. So when things became very expensive, we stopped doing it. 

Sajith Pai: Got it. So what happened when your site went 10x, what caused it? Advertising?

Konark Singhal: It was what is now called content marketing. We had Google SEO. We built a really frugal, really kick ass content team. Which is why Embibe bought us. I mean, we probably had a monthly salary of some two lakh rupees (for the content marketing / SEO team), and the kind of Google juice you’re driving with that was insane. That is also a reason why (Gaurav) Munjal (of Unacademy) wanted to buy us. But then I think he lost interest; the team also kind of didn’t take it ahead though we met him once. And again, Unacademy was not Unacademy that time, it was a small startup that time. 

Sajith Pai: So the second thing is a very frugal, very thought through or at least approach benefited by very thoughtful content SEO and performance marketing work very early on. But fundamentally challenged by the market. Because there are enough options and the product was not that differentiated.

Konark Singhal: There was no differentiation, the fundamental problem was there was not enough differentiation. I mean, clearly, people said “Yours is better. But I don’t know if I want to pay Rs 1000 for it.”

Sajith Pai: Let’s say you were to launch it today, okay? Or you could go back in time, okay, with all the learnings you had? How would you handle it differently?

Konark Singhal: I will probably not launch in that market. The market wasn’t there; there was a very, very small creamy layer. And there’s too many people who came in to tap that. That 3 million (market) itself would have been probably only enough to drive three four (₹ crs) gross revenue max, I think. And so many people came in and then everyone in the industry is undercutting and then Testbook said everything is free boss, the industry revenue started (trending) toward zero and it will probably become 30 lakhs (from 3-4 crs gross revenue) 

Sajith Pai: What was your revenue at the peak?

Konark Singhal: It was probably eight lakhs a month or something. 

Sajith Pai: When you looked at retention, did you spend your time on that? 

Konark Singhal: We did not.

Sajith Pai:  So these were short courses… like what were the products? 

Konark Singhal: Basically courses, these are test series, in fact not really courses they were mostly test series. You have 10 tests you can take them whenever you want. Generally these are purchased when the exam is approaching, so you can quickly run through it.

Sajith Pai: What was the ARPU?

Konark Singhal: Our ARPU, probably our average ticket price would probably have been ₹11-1,200. Probably, I mean, we of course, could have had a ₹2000 ARPU, but as we started selling, it became very clear to me very quickly, there was not a lot of people here for us to sell bigger ARPU. We figured people do a lot of tests. They give like 50 tests, 60 tests. And overall spend ₹2,000 – 5,000 rupee on courses. I think our average ARPU would have been ₹12 -1,300 towards the end; we started off with ₹5-600 and then.

Sajith Pai: So, the concept of churn, retention didn’t really matter because of the product being a one time transaction product.

Konark Singhal: We were not a subscription product, in the sense that they are to be renewed. To be fair, you could always say that the nature of the market is that the same guy kind of stays in the market for three or four years and continues to take multiple exams, so you can always say that once someone has come to you, they should continue to buy at least two test series from me every year. And if you’re not doing that.

Sajith Pai: You couldn’t measure LTV. 

Konark Singhal: Yeah, I mean, we could have. But I thought that the bucket was so leaky that we thought that these all failed. I mean, it didn’t. These are measures I would have taken if I thought there was a business here. I tried to realize there’s no business here and a lot of my energy four five months after the funding itself had to go into what do I pivot to? I was friends with Olive Board founder and Testbook founder and Online Tyyari founder. I knew they were trying to fix the the funnel. Which if you ask me, we would have also done it. It takes some effort, but we’ll do it. But I saw that they were doing all this and despite that they were not going anywhere. So then I figured why do I need to spend time there? Yeah, ultimately, you are a small startup with a crore and a half in the bank, and you cannot hire very expensive people. So really I mean at that point in time, basically, it was founders and a team assisting whatever was top of our mind. There was not much else. So then we have to do in the very beginning of what is top of your mind. I didn’t want to top our mind to be something which is anyway still not going to use with us. Because that’s what I was finding with my competitors. They were doing all those things and not getting results, they were spending five times as much money as us.

Sajith Pai: So for MountBlue, Why did you get attracted to MountBlue? Was it because you felt was a bigger market here? So I’m very curious about why did you pick MountBlue as a space? And before that how did you guys pick government exams?

Konark Singhal: Before MockBank, I had a startup (Manesh my other cofounder joined later) called SourceWeb which wasn’t working. So after SourceWeb I took like a month or more  break to figure it out. To ideate for the lack of a better word. And two ideas that came to mind; one was for delivery. And at that time there was no Swiggy; this is all 2013, right? And there were government jobs. Actually, my worldview for MockBank was shaped significantly by my Map My India experience. So, Map My India, now of course, the story is very well known given their IPO last year. But that time, it was an obscure company. The company’s official name is CE Info System, short for Computer Eyes Info Systems. Started in 1995 as one of those myriad small software shops that do some custom development kind of stuff, right? They continued to kind of just stay above water till 2004 or 2005, or thereabouts. Meanwhile, they’ve chanced upon the maps opportunity, as in, as some sort of enterprise need, because they had these American customers who are accustomed to using maps for their planning in the US. Coca Cola was their primary driver. And then they wanted to use the same techniques in India, but there was no one to do it. And these people had some willingness, and hence started doing it. And they basically became like a services shop to Coca Cola, doing ₹ 2-3 crores revenue and staying above water. 

Then the son went to Stanford. And then, you know, the son was smart, like he figured, okay, this is like Mapquest. So we can do something like a Mapquest. And in the Bay Area, he met Ajit Nazre, who was his Professor, and was in KPCB. So he pitched to Nazre there, and then Nazre invested. And then Qualcomm came in, then LightBox and then Nexus came in and then I got hired. A lot of my worldview was driven by my stint in Map My India. I did not know, I didn’t even have a conception that you can actually make a plan and go to a VC and get funded. I thought that businesses that are already running get funded. So, I thought I had to be able to bootstrap to real revenue and, profitability was my worldview. 

And this government test prep, I knew can be bootstrapped and all that. How do you like bootstrapped food delivery? And not that I had a lot of money. And I kind of had some understanding of government jobs test prep because I mean, I have a family full of government job aspirants and all my father, uncle, grandfather all had government jobs. So, I knew that it was a big opportunity. Everyone knew how big it is, how big a deal the government job thing is. So I knew the market was at least there. The number of people who want the service at large I knew, but then, of course I also had my doubts on how many and how much they can pay? How will they pay? I had all of those doubts but really I had no other good ideas. I was not in a job. I was also out of a formal job for two years then. Parents were asking “You’ve done one startup, put in ₹10 lakh rupees, nothing happened there. And like what are you doing sitting at home?

And at this point, I was like, okay, by this day, if I don’t get another idea, I’ll do this. Yeah. And that’s how it went. So basically what happened was by end of April, I decided I’ll start the government jobs test prep site. And either by first or second of May, I had my first sale or something like that. So that’s how really this happened. So, I had some ideas. Nothing that I thought I could bootstrap to some profit, some revenue, some demonstrable traction other than this. How many food deliveries can you make with your own money? Especially someone like me who had like done one startup? Not earned for three, four years, I had no money. And that was a very different time right Sajith. Now angels fund pre-revenue stage. Not then. The number of VCs like SAIF, Helion were very small. 

Sajith Pai: So how did MountBlue happen? How did you pick MountBlue?

Konark Singhal: So I mean, I think Mock Bank was a great process of discovery. So I kind always had my doubts about B2C. Map My India was B2B. And then I did one B2B startup, Source Web, which didn’t work. We had a B2C startup MockBank which didn’t work. So I had kind of become almost unfundable after the two startups of which one was venture funded. Nothing worked. I was unfundable, so I said boss I again have to bootstrap. And, how do you bootstrap B2C businesses? B2B is much more easy to bootstrap right? You can go and crack a big sale yourself. B2C well, how can you crack a big sale? There’s no one big sale right? 

Secondly, I’ve have always been very, very socially / nationally-minded since whenever I remember. I remember obsessing over election results, when I was a 10 – 12 year old kid. So I’ve always been very political-minded, social-minded, national-minded. So I had started to develop a disdain of what I’m doing in government jobs. What are you really adding to what is ultimately a zero sum game? Whether or not people prepare or not, only x persons will succeed. So really, what are you really adding? I mean, what is the value that we’re adding to society? Is nothing really being added? So I also wanted to make sure that whatever I do, really adds to society. 

Ultimately all these problems that India has are PPP problems. Right? I mean, if people are richer, there will be water, there will be healthcare, there will be education. The rich don’t have a problem with education, and healthcare. It is only the poor. Ultimately, it’s a PPP problem. So how do you approach a PPP problem? Ultimately, you have to get people skilled, you have to get people more employable. I mean, I have never subscribed to the idea that we have a heavy unemployment problem. I’ve always subscribed that we have a heavier employability problem. Manish Sabharwal’s writings on this topic have always resonated with me. I also wanted to do something for someone at least that the needle move for them, and even when you do it for less people, at least you do it for them, you move the needle for them. So MountBlue was that. Maybe I will not be able to help a lot of people. I mean, we do (a batch of) 300 right now. We have been on for five years now. Since, 2017. But I can say with all honesty that out of the 300, 50% of people, or at least 40% people that we train may not even become a software engineer if it is not for us. Or they may really join software testing but maybe never be able to do development. So some of it was this as well, that at least the interventions you make will really transform a few lives versus what I was doing in MockBank. 

Sajith Pai: This is interesting.

Konark Singhal: So a little bit of a founder market fit thing came here.

Sajith Pai: So just a little bit away from Mount Blue. You mentioned Manish Sabharwal whose writings you enjoyed reading and learning from. Who are others? Do you recommend founders read a specific book? Or watch a YouTube video podcast series? Is there anything you recommend?

Konark Singhal: Paul Graham’s writings. I also recommend people read you (Sajith Pai). Most of all, I recommend people to go and work for a fast growing startup.  So, what I tell people when they come to me, some people do, is that boss, if you have some idea of what space you want to work in, find the fastest growing startup in that field and just go and do whatever job they want you to do. Go and tell the founder, I’ll do whatever you want to do. Just take me. Because only then will you see opportunities. You’ll start to see what part of this space is broken. And then you can start to see if it can be fixed or not. Can you fix it? What will it take to fix it? And there’s a huge Dunning Kruger (syndrome) that happens right? My first company SourceWeb was classic Dunning Kruger.

And, if people don’t have an idea of what space they like, but they still want to do a startup, I tell them go and work for mammoth co like an Amazon or Flipkart, big tech but ops heavy, and not big tech like Google. So if you want to do deep tech, there are some people will find in a sutta (smoking) break who are doing deep tech stuff in Flipkart. Anyway, start talking to them. And you will also find someone who is doing like heavy operational stuff, cash on delivery phat raha hai (is breaking),  returns phat raha hai, warehouse phat raha hai. So try to go and do a work at a company which has both operations and tech. Right? And depth in both. So that you will automatically start to find friends in the places you like. Therefore, I tell people who have no idea of what space to join a ops heavy big tech, but if you know the space then find the fastest growing startup and go there.

Sajith Pai: You defined PMF as effortless sales, where you virtually have to throttle sales. So, do you have a playbook for PMF? Like if a founder reaches you and says, how should I approach PMF, Konark? Would you recommend any particular kind of  approach?

Konark Singhal: So what I do is on topics that I find relevant, I maintain an Evernote database, I also have Roam. Roam is my brain. Evernote is my database. So Roam is for mental models and things. Evernote is more like accha, this is tagging. Isme PMF ke baare mein hai, isme culture ke bare mein hai (I save articles on PMF, Culture etc in my Evernote database).Often I don’t even read an article. Yeah. So yesterday for example. I came across something on community building I didn’t even read. I Evernoted it, right? So I still send it to five people who are building something. Iswar you know, right? Ishwar Sundaraman is building Unsolved. I have a small check in that. So I sent it to Iswar.  

So when people come to me for specific things I share with them the specific Evernote library, isko padh le (pls read it). Like if you don’t give me any specific questions like you asked me, then i don’t try to theorise. I have a bunch of resources that I think are good. Some of them may be self-contradictory but yeah, I think you’re smart enough to figure out what will work for you. I can give it to you immediately. There is two days of reading material, go read it. And if you have a specific problem you’re dealing with, then you tell me what is happening with you. Maybe I can give you some specific advice there.

So on PMF, I’d recommend that you read some of the articles on PMF in the Evernote library. I’ll just give them that and point to your (Sajith Pai’s) articles. 

Sajith Pai: Now this is great. Thank you so much.